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Photonic systems based on energy-time entanglement have been proposed to test local realism using
the Bell inequality. A violation of this inequality normally also certifies security of device-independent
quantum key distribution, so that an attacker cannot eavesdrop or control the system. Here, we show
how this security test can be circumvented in energy-time entangled systems when using standard
avalanche photodetectors, allowing an attacker to compromise the system without leaving a trace.
With tailored pulses of classical light we reach Bell values up to 3.63 at 97.6% detector efficiency
which is an extreme violation. This is the first demonstration of a violation-faking source that
both gives tunable violation and high detector efficiency. The implications are severe: the standard
Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality cannot be used to show device-independent security for
standard postselecting energy-time entanglement setups. We conclude with suggestions of improved
tests and experimental setups that can re-establish device-independent security.
A Bell experiment [1] is a bipartite experiment that can
be used to test for pre-existing properties that are inde-
pendent of the measurement choice at each site. Formally
speaking, the experiment tests if there is a “local real-
ist” description of the experiment, that contains these
pre-existing properties. Such a test can be used as the
basis for security of Quantum Key Distribution [2, 3]
(QKD). QKD uses a bipartite quantum system shared
between two parties (Alice and Bob), that allows them
to secretly share a cryptographic key. The first QKD
protocol [2] (BB84) is based on quantum uncertainty [4]
between non-commuting measurements, usually of photon
polarization. The Ekert protocol [3] (E91) bases security
on a Bell test instead of the uncertainty relation. Such
a test indicates, through violation of the corresponding
Bell inequality, a secure key distribution system. This
requires quantum entanglement, and because of this E91
is also called entanglement-based QKD.
To properly show that an E91 cryptographic system is
secure, or alternatively, that no local realist description ex-
ists of an experiment, a proper violation of the associated
Bell inequality is needed. As soon as a proper violation
is achieved, the inner workings of the system is not im-
portant anymore, a fact known as device-independent
security [5, 6], or a loophole-free test of local realism [7].
In the security context, the size of the violation is related
to the amount of key that can be securely extracted from
the system. However, a proper (loophole-free) violation is
difficult to achieve. For long-distance experiments, pho-
tons is the system of choice and one particularly difficult
problem is to detect enough of the photon pairs; this is
known as the efficiency loophole [8–10].
If the violation is not good enough, there may be a local
realist description of the experiment, giving an insecure
QKD system. Even worse, an attacker could control the
QKD system in this case. One particular example of
this occurs when using avalanche photodetectors (APD:s)
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which are the most commonly used detectors in commer-
cial QKD systems: these detectors can be controlled by a
process called “blinding” [11] which enables control via
classical light pulses. When using photon polarization in
the system, and if the efficiency is low enough in the Bell
test, the quantum-mechanical prediction can be faked in
such a controlled system [12, 13]. This means that the
(apparent) Bell inequality violation can be faked, making
a QKD system seem secure while it is not. Note that a
proper (loophole-free) violation cannot be faked in this
manner.
In this paper we investigate energy-time entanglement-
based systems in general and the Franson interferom-
eter [14] in particular. Traditional polarization cod-
ing is sensitive to polarization effects caused by opti-
cal fibers [15] whereas energy-time entanglement is more
robust against this type of disturbance. This property
has led to an increased attention to systems based on
energy-time entanglement since it allows a design without
moving mechanical parts which reduces complexity in
practical implementations. A number of applications of
energy-time entanglement, such as the QKD, quantum
teleportation and quantum repeaters are described in [16].
It is already known that a proper Bell test is more
demanding to achieve in energy-time-entanglement sys-
tems with postselection [17, 18], but also that certain
assumptions on the properties of photons reduce the de-
mands to the same level as for a photon-polarization-based
test [19, 20]. The property in question is particle-like be-
havior of the photon: that it does not “jump” from one
arm of an interferometer to the other. Now, clearly, classi-
cal light pulses cannot “jump” from one arm to the other,
so the question arises: is it at all possible to control the
output of the detectors using classical light pulses, to
make them fake the quantum correlations? Below, we an-
swer this question in the positive, give the details of such
an attack, and its experimental implementation. More-
over, not only are faked quantum correlations possible to
reach at a faked detector efficiency of 100%, but even the
extreme predictions of nonlocal Popescu-Rohrlich boxes
[21] are possible to fake at this high detector efficiency.
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Figure 1: Experimental setup of the Franson
interferometer. The setup consists of a source,
2× 2-couplers (C), delay loops (∆T ), phase modulators
φA and φB and detectors (D).
Such extreme predictions reaches the algebraic maximum
4 of the CHSH inequality, and would make a QKD system
user suspicious; an attacker would of course not exceed
the quantum bound 2
√
2 [22].
I. BELL’S INEQUALITY AND THE FRANSON
INTERFEROMETER
A Bell test of device-independent security, alternatively
local realism, is always associated with a Bell inequality.
The relevant part of the E91 QKD protocol up to and
including the Bell test looks as follows. The general setup
is a central source connected to two measurement sites,
one at Alice and the other at Bob. The source prepares
an entangled quantum state and distribute it to Alice
and Bob who each can choose between a number of mea-
surement settings for their devices. The output can take
the values −1, 0, or +1, denoting for example horizon-
tal polarization, non-detection, and vertical polarization.
Here we are considering a pulsed source so that there
are well-defined experimental runs, and therefore also
well-defined non-detection events. Alice selects a random
integer j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and performs the corresponding mea-
surement Aj . Bob does the same with a random number
k ∈ {2, 3, 4} and measurement Bk. The quantum state
and measurements are such that if j = k, the outcomes
are highly (anti-)correlated. This preparation and mea-
surement process is performed over and over again until
enough data has been gathered.
After a measurement batch has been completed, Alice
and Bob publicly announce which settings j and k were
used (but not the corresponding outcomes!). They can
then determine which measurements used the same set-
tings j = k and use the highly (anti-)correlated outcomes
for key generation. The remaining outcomes correspond-
ing to j 6= k can be used for security testing, in the
Bell [1]-CHSH [23] inequality
S2 = |E(A1B2) + E(A3B2)|
+ |E(A3B4)− E(A1B4)| ≤ 2, (1)
where E(AjBk) is the expected value of the product, often
called “correlation” in this context. If the experimental
S2 is larger than 2 there is a violation, and the system
is secure; there can be no local realist description of the
experiment. The size of the violation is related to output
key rate; the maximal quantum prediction is 2
√
2.
However, a proper violation is difficult to achieve. There
are a number ways that the test can give S2 > 2 but still
fail, a number of loopholes [7]. The most serious one here
is the detector efficiency loophole, that non-detections or
zeros are not properly taken into account. If the zeros are
ignored, conditioning on detection at both sites gives the
conditional correlation E(AjBk|coinc.), and a modified
bound [9, 10]
S2,c = |E(A1B2|coinc.) + E(A3B2|coinc.)|
+ |E(A3B4|coinc.)− E(A1B4|coinc.)| ≤ 4η − 2.
(2)
The efficiency η is the ratio of coincidences to local detec-
tions [10], and needs to be above 82% for the quantum
value to give a violation. This is ignored in current exper-
iments, almost [24–26] without exception. In the context
of QKD, ignoring the zeros is allowed only if the attacker
(Eve) cannot control the detectors to make no-detections
depend on the local settings j and k. Unfortunately, the
commonly used APD:s can be controlled [11, 13] unless
extra precautions are taken.
For this paper we have investigated a quantum device
based on energy-time entanglement with postselection.
While the results presented below are acquired from this
particular device, the results apply to any such system.
The Franson interferometer [14] is shown in Fig. 1 and is
built around a source emitting time-correlated photons
to both Alice and Bob. The unbalanced Mach-Zehnder
interferometers have a time difference ∆T between the
paths. In our pulsed setting, the time difference between
a late and early source emission is ∆T , giving rise to inter-
ference between the cases “early source emission, photons
take the long path” and “late source emission, photons
take the short path”. There will be no interference if
the photons “take different paths” through the analysis
stations, and those events are discarded as non-coincident
in a later step.
The analysis stations have variable phase modulators
and the setting choices are φAj for measuring Aj at Alice
and φBk for measuring Bk at Bob. The quantum state
is such that, given coincident detection, the correlation
between Aj and Bk is high if φ
A
j + φ
B
k = 0. In the
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(a) Constructive interference at the + output gives
a large early timeslot intensity and a corresponding
click.
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(b) Destructive interference at the − output gives a
small early timeslot intensity and no corresponding
click.
Figure 2: The blinding attack causes the detector to click only for pulses of greater intensity than IT . If Eve sends
three pulses of equal intensity I, they will arrive as four after the interferometer. By changing the phase shifts ωE and
ωL between the pulses at the source, she can control the intensity of the early and late middle pulses at the ± output
ports, giving clicks as desired. Here, φ = 0, ωE = pi/8, and ωL = pi/4. The first and last pulse have a constant
intensity of I/4.
absence of noise, the correlation between Alice’s and
Bob’s outcomes will be [14]
E(AjBk|coinc.) = cos(φAj + φBk ) (3)
This again violates the CHSH inequality (1), but only if
the postselection is ignored [17]. When the postselection
is taken into account one arrives at the inequality (2) with
η = 50%, giving a bound of 6 which is no restriction. The
question is rather if the system can be controlled by Eve,
to fake the violation.
II. FAKING THE BELL INEQUALITY
VIOLATION
An eavesdropper (Eve) performs the attack by replac-
ing the source with a faked-state generator that blinds the
APD:s (see Fig. 2) and makes them click at chosen instants
in time. The blinding is accomplished using classical light
pulses superimposed over continuous-wave (CW) illumi-
nation [11]. In normal operation, an APD reacts to even a
single incoming photon. A photon that enters the detector
will create an avalanche of electrical current which results
in a signal, or “click”, when the current crosses a certain
threshold. The avalanche current is then quenched by
lowering the APD bias voltage to below the breakdown
voltage, making the detector ready for another photon,
and resulting in so-called Geiger mode operation. Under
the influence of continuous-wave (CW) illumination, the
quenching circuitry will make the current through the
APD:s proportional to the power of the incoming light.
This will change the behaviour of the APD into so-called
linear mode, more similar to a classical photodiode. It
will no longer react to single photons, nor register clicks
in the usual Geiger-like way and is therefore said to be
“blind”. Appropriate choice of CW illumination intensity
will make the APD insensitive to single photons yet still
register a click when a bright pulse of classical light is
superimposed over the CW illumination [11].
What remains is to construct classical light pulses that
will give clicks in the way that Eve desires, violating the
Bell inequality test for the Franson interferometer. Eve
uses pulses with intensity I and pulse length τ  ∆T
intermingled with the CW light that blinds the APD:s.
A single pulse emitted by the source will be split when
traveling through the interferometer, resulting in two
pulses in each output port with intensity I/4 each. If
instead two pulses are emitted, separated by ∆T and with
phase difference ω, these two pulses will split to three.
The middle pulse of the three is built up by two parts, so
that the ±1 outputs show interference,
I+(φ, ω) = I cos2
(
φ+ω
2
)
I−(φ, ω) = I sin2
(
φ+ω
2
)
,
(4)
where φ is the phase setting of the local analysis station.
The chosen ω controls the φ dependence of the output.
For example, if I is just less than 2IT and ω = 0, there
will be a +1 click for |φ| < pi/2 and a −1 click otherwise.
However, this is not enough to fake the Bell violation,
because the detection time needs to depend on the local
setting [17]. To enable this, Eve makes the source emit
a group of three pulses separated by ∆T , with phase
difference ωE between the first and second pulse, and ωL
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Figure 3: Discretized local hidden-variable model [17], that can give any Bell value between 2 and 4. The hidden
variables are 0 ≤ r < 1 (a real number in the unit interval) and and Θ = npi4 where 0 ≤ n ≤ 7 is an integer. The value
0 ≤ p ≤ 1/4 can be chosen freely, and the output Bell value is S2 = 4− 8p, so that the “classical” S2 = 2 is obtained
with p = 1/4, the “quantum” S2 = 2
√
2 is obtained with p = (2−√2)/4 (as in the figure), and the “nonlocal-box”
S2 = 4 is obtained with p = 0, all at 100% efficiency and 50% postselection.
between the second and third pulse. When this pulse
train passes through the interferometer, the output is
four pulses, where the two center pulses have controllable
intensity because of interference. The intensities for these
two (Early/Late) pulses are
I+E (φ, ωE) = I cos
2
(
φ+ωE
2
)
I−E (φ, ωE) = I sin
2
(
φ+ωE
2
)
I+L (φ, ωL) = I cos
2
(
φ+ωL
2
)
I−L (φ, ωL) = I sin
2
(
φ+ωL
2
)
.
(5)
For example, with the same choice of I as above, ωE = 0,
and ωL = pi/2, there will be an early +1 click if φ = 0,
and a late −1 click if φ = pi/2. Note that the pulse trains
to Alice and Bob can be chosen independently.
To fake the violation of the Bell inequality, Eve uses
the local hidden variable (LHV) model in Fig. 3, which
is a discretized version of an earlier known model [17].
This technique can be extended to give the entire set of
quantum predictions but we have here chosen to focus
on the settings used for the present Bell test: φA1 = 0,
φA3 = pi/2, φ
B
2 = −pi/4, and φB4 = −3pi/4 so that only θ
in increments of pi/4. Eve randomly selects the hidden
variables r and θ, and reads off the desired results for
the two settings at Alice. If the results are in the same
time slot, she uses two pulses, and can directly calculate
the needed phase difference. If the results are in different
time slots (this only happens for Alice), Eve uses three
pulses and calculates the two phase differences. The same
r and θ are used to calculate the phase difference for Bob.
Repeating this procedure will produce random outcomes
(to Alice and Bob) that give exactly the quantum predic-
tions for the mentioned settings, violating the Bell-CHSH
inequality.
By adjusting parameters of the LHV model we can go
even further and produce Bell values up to and including
the value 4, see Fig. 3. But remember that Alice and Bob
would be very confused if their security test displayed the
value 4 as that would mean that their experiment con-
sists of unphysical and nonlocal Popescu-Rohrlich (PR)
boxes [21]. Eve would avoid this but could in principle
use this possibility to negate the effects of noise, by ad-
justing the LHV model to exceed the quantum prediction,
knowing that the noise will lower the violation to below
the quantum bound again.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The attack was experimentally implemented as shown
in Fig. 4. Built using standard fiber-optical components,
it is designed to meet the requirements set in the section
II. The continuous wave is produced by a CW laser while
the pulses are created by a pulsed laser. These two light
sources are combined at a fiber-optic 2× 2 coupler and
then split into one beam for Alice and one for Bob. Each
of these beams are then sent into a fiber-optic 3 × 3
coupler (tritters) that equally divides them into three
arms. The first arm consists of a ∆T delay loop and a
phase modulator ωE , the second arm has two ∆T delay
loops and a phase modulator ωM (so that ωL = ωM −ωE)
while the third arm performs no action. The three arms
are then combined by a second 3 × 3 coupler into one
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Figure 4: Experimental setup of the attack on the Franson interferometer. The setup consists of a continuous-wave
(CW) laser for blinding the detectors, a pulsed laser for generating the bright classical light pulses, fiber-optical
couplers (C) delay loops (∆T ), phase modulators (ω and φ) and detectors (D).
output port that creates the output of the faked state
source generator.
The source sends bright light pulses with the setting and
phase difference(s) to Alice’s and Bob’s analysis stations
in the Franson interferometer. Each of the two analysis
stations are constructed in a similar fashion: Two fiber-
optic 2× 2 couplers and one delay loop ∆T and a phase
modulator φA (Alice’s side) or φB (Bob’s side). Gated
APD:s were used as detectors. This type of detector re-
duces the dark counts by raising the bias voltage above
the breakdown voltage only for a short time period when
an incoming photon is expected. These gated APD:s are
still vulnerable to the blinding attack described above
even if the details of the attack are slightly different. Since
the CW power becomes unevenly distributed between de-
tectors, the efficiency of the blinding was affected. This
imbalance was avoided by installing digital variable atten-
uators at the output ports. In addition, optical isolators
were placed in front of the detectors in order to prevent
crosstalk.
Joint Alice-Bob trials were performed with the pulse
amplitudes as described by eqs. (4) and (5) and depicted
in Fig. 2. At the desired detector and timeslot a “click”
will be forced (Fig. 2a) by constructive interference while
destructive interference causes “no click” (Fig. 2b). The
sampling time used was 1 s and each experiment was
run for at least 27 s (see Fig. 5). At each point in time,
the joint probabilities of Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes are
computed from the detector counts and these were then
used to determine the Bell value. Note that the early and
late timeslots are measured in different experimental runs.
The average faked Bell value is
S2 = 2.5615± 0.0064 (6)
which clearly violates the Bell bound 2. Our source has a
repetition rate of of 5 kHz, and the average rate of clicks
is 4.88 kHz, giving an average efficiency of 97.6 %. The
experimental Bell value is lower than the quantum predic-
tion because of noise, most of which is due to unwanted
clicks because pulses below the threshold are close to the
threshold, and thus sensitive to small intensity variations
of the lasers.
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Figure 5: The faked Bell of our source is 2.5615± 0.0064
(solid black line) which clearly violates the CHSH
inequality S2 ≤ 2. It is possible to increase the faked
Bell value up to 3.6386± 0.0096 (dotted blue line, data
for timeslots where p ≤ r < 1/2− p or
1/2 + p ≤ r < 1− p). In both cases the efficiency is
97.6 %. Each point in the diagram corresponds to the S2
value for 1 s worth of data.
Adjusting the source to produce fake nonlocal PR
boxes [21] gives a faked Bell value of
S2 = 3.6386± 0.0096 (7)
which is even beyond the quantum bound 2
√
2. The
efficiency remains at 97.6 %, and noise still lowers the
value from the ideal 4. It should be noted that Eve is free
to combine pulses and phases at will in order to produce
any Bell value between 0 and and the above value. If the
noise rate of the system is known she can compensate by
aiming for a higher Bell value, and letting the noise bring
it back down. This allows her to reach a faked Bell value
that is indistinguishable from 2
√
2.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES
Our faked Bell value seemingly violates the Bell-CHSH
inequality even though we are dealing with outcomes from
a local realist model. The more appropriate Bell inequality
(2) for conditional correlations is clearly ineffective as
a test of device-independent security with energy-time
entanglement that uses postselection. The bound is too
high. We need to improve the security tests in such a way
that they unequivocally show security, that they can give
a loophole-free violation of local realism.
There are two ways to proceed: one is to use fast
switching [17, 18], and the Braunstein-Caves chained Bell
inequalities [8, 27] with more terms. The standard chained
inequalities read
SN = |E(A1B2) + E(A3B2)|
+ |E(A3B4) + E(A5B4)|
+ . . .
+ |E(A2N−1B2N )− E(A1B2N )| ≤ 2N − 2.
(8)
In the Franson interferometer with fast switching (F), the
chained inequalities are weakened but still produces a
usable bound even after postselection on coincidence,
SN,F = |E(A1B2|coinc.) + E(A3B2|coinc.)|
+ |E(A3B4|coinc.) + E(A5B4|coinc.)|
+ . . .
+ |E(A2N−1B2N |coinc.)− E(A1B2N |coinc.)|
≤2N − 1.
(9)
This only gives the upper bound S2,F ≤ 3 for the Bell-
CHSH value, so the standard test is not useful even with
fast switching. But the quantum-mechanical prediction
SN,F = 2N cos(pi/2N) does violate this if N ≥ 3, even
though the violation is smaller than the standard Bell
test. This re-establishes device-independent security for
energy-time-entangled QKD. In practice, though, the
requirements are high since the lowest acceptable visibility
is 94.64 % [18].
A better solution would be to eliminate the core prob-
lem: The postselection loophole. One alternative is
the use of “hugging” interferometers [28] that gives an
energy-time-entangled interferometer with postselection,
but without a postselection loophole. The drawback is
the requirement of two fiber links each to Alice and Bob.
A Bell violation has been experimentally shown [29], even
with 1 km fiber length [30].
V. CONCLUSION
Bell tests are a cornerstone of quantum key distribution
and is necessary for device-independent security. Device-
independent Bell inequality violation must be performed
with care to avoid loopholes. Time-energy-entanglement
has the distinct advantage over polarization that time and
energy is more easily communicated over long distances
than polarization. Therefore, time-energy entanglement
may be preferable as quantum resource to perform reliable
key distribution.
In this paper we have shown that quantum key distri-
bution systems based on energy-time entanglement with
postselection are vulnerable to attack if the corresponding
security tests use the original Bell inequality. By blinding
the detectors and using an LHV model Eve lets Alice
and Bob think their system violates Bell’s inequality even
though she uses classical light. This lets the attacker
fully control the key output and break the security of the
system.
7Our attack has been performed with a detector effi-
ciency of 97.6 % which is high enough to avoid the fair
sampling assumption. We can compare this to Gerhardt
et al. [13] where the detector efficiency was 50 % when
using active basis choice; that attack has an upper limit
of 82.8 % [9, 10], while our attack is only limited to ex-
perimental losses. In other words, the attack is possible
even with perfect detection efficiency.
In addition, our attack can produce the unphysical value
S2 = 4 at any efficiency. It remains a fact that fast switch-
ing will restrict this largest value to 3, but our attack
demonstrates the level of control an attacker can exert
onto the system. In order to build a device-independent
QKD system based on energy-time-entanglement the de-
signer will either have to use stronger tests such as the
Braunstein-Caves inequality, or use a system that does
not contain the postselection loophole.
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